openova/platform/openbao
hatiyildiz 3993f5fc31 docs(pass-31): openbao + librechat DNS-placeholder carry-over fixes
platform/openbao/README.md ingress hosts (line 108) had `bao.<domain>` while
the same file's ClusterSecretStore example (line 127) used the canonical
`bao.<location-code>.<sovereign-domain>` form. Pass 7's active-active fix
addressed the body but missed the ingress placeholder. Aligned with the
canonical form.

platform/librechat/README.md OAuth callback (line 154) had
`chat.ai-hub.<domain>/oauth/openid/callback` — same Application-endpoint
shape Pass 25 fixed in llm-gateway. Pass 22 marked the file clean and Pass
29 fixed the Keycloak issuer line but didn't re-sweep. Per NAMING §5.2
Application endpoints are `{app}.{environment}.{sovereign-domain}`. Fixed.

docs/GLOSSARY.md verified clean — single-source-of-truth has held across
the loop (Pass 6/7/14/20/22/26/27 all consistent with current GLOSSARY).

Validation log Pass 31 entry includes meta-note: third file (librechat)
that needed re-opening after a "clean" mark — banner scans miss YAML-block
drift. Future passes should default to a full placeholder-shape grep on
every file touched.
2026-04-27 22:34:10 +02:00
..
README.md docs(pass-31): openbao + librechat DNS-placeholder carry-over fixes 2026-04-27 22:34:10 +02:00

OpenBao

Secrets management backend for Catalyst. Apache 2.0 / MPL 2.0 fork of HashiCorp Vault, drop-in API-compatible.

Status: Accepted | Updated: 2026-04-27

Catalyst role: Per-Sovereign supporting service in the Catalyst control plane (see docs/PLATFORM-TECH-STACK.md §2.3). For multi-region semantics and rotation policy, docs/SECURITY.md is canonical.


Overview

OpenBao is a Linux Foundation project forked from HashiCorp Vault after HashiCorp changed Vault's license from MPL 2.0 to the Business Source License (BSL 1.1). OpenBao retains the open license and provides API-compatible secrets management.

OpenBao provides centralized secrets management with:

  • Secrets stored securely outside of Git (Git holds only ExternalSecret references).
  • Independent Raft cluster per region (no stretched cluster).
  • Asynchronous Performance Replication from primary region to standbys.
  • Integration with External Secrets Operator (ESO).
  • Workload authentication via SPIFFE SVID — short-lived, auto-rotating.

Architecture: independent Raft per region (NOT a stretched cluster)

Each region runs its own 3-node Raft cluster. Quorum is intra-region only — region failures are independent failure domains. Cross-region replication is asynchronous Performance Replication from primary → secondaries.

flowchart TB
    subgraph Region1["Region 1 (primary)"]
        V1[OpenBao 3-node Raft]
        ES1[ExternalSecret CR]
        KS1[K8s Secret]
    end

    subgraph Region2["Region 2 (replica)"]
        V2[OpenBao 3-node Raft<br>independent quorum]
        ES2[ExternalSecret CR]
        KS2[K8s Secret]
    end

    subgraph Region3["Region 3 (DR replica)"]
        V3[OpenBao 3-node Raft<br>independent quorum]
        ES3[ExternalSecret CR]
        KS3[K8s Secret]
    end

    V1 -.->|"async perf replication"| V2
    V1 -.->|"async perf replication"| V3
    V1 -->|"local read"| ES1
    V2 -->|"local read"| ES2
    V3 -->|"local read"| ES3
    ES1 -->|"materialize"| KS1
    ES2 -->|"materialize"| KS2
    ES3 -->|"materialize"| KS3

Key design (canonical in docs/SECURITY.md §5):

  • Independent Raft per region. No cross-region quorum. A whole-region failure does NOT block any other region.
  • Single-primary writes. Rotations and new-secret writes go to the primary OpenBao only.
  • Async perf replication. Lag <1s typical; replicas serve reads at sub-10ms latency.
  • Explicit DR promotion. Either sovereign-admin-approved or automated via failover-controller (with strict criteria — not on every blip).
  • Apps read locally. Each region's ExternalSecret pulls from its local OpenBao replica.
  • No SOPS. Plaintext never in Git.

The earlier active-active bidirectional design was rejected as a stretched cluster — it would have made one region's network blip take down all writes. This file's architecture matches the agreed independent-Raft model.


Deployment Options

Option Type Notes
OpenBao Self-Hosted Self-hosted Full control, one per cluster
AWS Secrets Manager Managed If AWS chosen
GCP Secret Manager Managed If GCP chosen
Azure Key Vault Managed If Azure chosen

Recommended: OpenBao Self-Hosted for full control


Configuration

OpenBao Deployment (Helm)

server:
  ha:
    enabled: true
    replicas: 3
    raft:
      enabled: true
      config: |
        storage "raft" {
          path = "/openbao/data"
        }        

  dataStorage:
    enabled: true
    size: 10Gi
    storageClass: <storage-class>

  ingress:
    enabled: true
    ingressClassName: cilium
    hosts:
      - host: bao.<location-code>.<sovereign-domain>

injector:
  enabled: false  # Using ESO instead

ClusterSecretStore (local read)

Each region defines ONE ClusterSecretStore pointing at its local OpenBao replica. Apps in any region read from their local replica only — replication delivers post-write values within seconds.

apiVersion: external-secrets.io/v1beta1
kind: ClusterSecretStore
metadata:
  name: bao-local
spec:
  provider:
    vault:                                # ESO provider type stays `vault` —
                                          # OpenBao is wire-compatible.
      server: "https://bao.<location-code>.<sovereign-domain>"
      path: "secret"
      version: "v2"
      auth:
        kubernetes:
          mountPath: "kubernetes"
          role: "external-secrets"

Note: The ESO provider type remains vault because OpenBao is API-compatible and ESO uses the same provider configuration.

Writes go to the primary region

Secret rotations, new-secret creates, and policy updates target the primary OpenBao only. Replicas refuse writes (Performance Replication is one-way: primary → standby). The ESO PushSecret is configured to point at the primary's ClusterSecretStore explicitly:

apiVersion: external-secrets.io/v1alpha1
kind: PushSecret
metadata:
  name: push-db-credentials
  namespace: databases
spec:
  refreshInterval: 1h
  secretStoreRefs:
    - name: bao-primary                   # writes target the primary region only
      kind: ClusterSecretStore
  selector:
    secret:
      name: db-credentials
  data:
    - match:
        secretKey: password
        remoteRef:
          remoteKey: databases/db-credentials
          property: password

ExternalSecret (local read in every region)

Reads always pull from the local OpenBao replica.

apiVersion: external-secrets.io/v1beta1
kind: ExternalSecret
metadata:
  name: db-credentials
  namespace: databases
spec:
  refreshInterval: 1h
  secretStoreRef:
    name: bao-local
    kind: ClusterSecretStore
  target:
    name: db-credentials
    creationPolicy: Owner
  data:
    - secretKey: password
      remoteRef:
        key: databases/db-credentials
        property: password

DR promotion

If the primary region fails, a replica is explicitly promoted (sovereign-admin approval or failover-controller automation). New writes are blocked briefly during promotion (~30s), then the new primary accepts writes. See docs/SECURITY.md §5.2.


Bootstrap Procedure

  1. Catalyst bootstrap (Phase 0 of Sovereign provisioning) deploys OpenBao as independent Raft cluster per region (no stretched cluster — see docs/SECURITY.md §5).
  2. OpenBao initialized with Kubernetes auth in each region.
  3. The first sovereign-admin saves unseal keys securely offline (per region).
  4. Cross-region async perf replication is configured for read availability and DR.
  5. ESO configured with local-region ClusterSecretStores; cross-region reads via the same workload SVID.
  6. Initial secrets created via K8s + PushSecrets, never plaintext in Git.

No SOPS: Credentials entered interactively during bootstrap, never stored in Git. See docs/SECURITY.md.


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